Abstract. In this work we revisit the SPDZ multiparty computation protocol by Damgård et al. for securely computing a function in the presence of an unbounded number of dishonest parties. The SPDZ protocol is distinguished by its fast performance.
Introduction
The SPDZ MPC Protocol. Since the initial theoretical possibility results for multiparty computation (MPC) in the late eighties [2, 5, 8, 10] , much effort has been put into reducing the (communication and computation) complexity of MPC, G. Spini-Supported by the Algant-Doc doctoral program, www.algant.eu. and we are now at a stage where MPC is at the verge of being practical. One of the currently known protocols that is (close to) efficient enough for practical deployment is the so-called SPDZ protocol by Damgård et al. [7] , and its variations from [6] . The efficiency of the SPDZ protocol is due to a clever mix of cryptographic operations, which can mostly be pushed into a preprocessing phase, and very efficient information-theoretic techniques.
The SPDZ MPC protocol offers security against a dishonest majority, i.e., there is no bound on the number of corrupt parties the protocol can tolerate: even if all but one of the parties are corrupt, that one single party is still protected. A downside of such protocols with security against a dishonest majority is that they are inherently susceptible to a "denial-of-service" attack: even one single dishonest party can enforce the protocol to fail, meaning that the honest parties have to abort the computation without learning the outcome, whereas the cheating party may actually learn it. Furthermore, the SPDZ MPC protocol is such that the cheating party who launches the attack remains covert: the (honest) parties know that there is a cheater among them that caused the protocol to fail, but they have no way to identify the culprit. As such, with little effort and with nothing to fear, a single party can prevent the SPDZ protocol from doing its job.
Identifiable vs Non-identifiable Abort.
We feel that such an non-identifiable abort, where the honest parties cannot identify the cheating party that caused the abort, is a serious drawback for practical deployment. In real-life scenarios, there are many reasons for why a party may be tempted to enforce the protocol to fail: he may know or suspect that he is not going to like the outcome, he may gain an advantage by learning the outcome but preventing the others from learning it, he may want to sabotage the computation out of malevolence, etc. And of course, if that party does not have to fear any consequence because he knows that he will not be caught, there is little incentive for him not to cheat. As such, in real-life scenarios, it is not unlikely that such an abort will actually take place. Furthermore, once such an abort does take place, the affected honest parties are stuck -there is nothing they can do: they cannot call anyone to account, and re-trying the computation is (almost) useless, because the cheating party can just re-do the attack.
In contrast to this is the concept of identifiable abort, where we require that, as a consequence of launching a denial-of-service attack, the cheating party will be identified as being the culprit. Obviously, for a protocol that offers identifiable abort, there is much less incentive for a party to cheat and enforce the protocol to fail, because he knows that he will be caught and have to deal with the consequences. Thus, if there is some severe enough punishment, an abort is unlikely to occur. Furthermore, even if an abort does occur, the affected honest parties have room for further actions: not only can they call the cheating party to account, they can also re-do the computation with the culprit excluded, and this way they can still obtain the outcome of the computation eventually. 1 We point out that non-identifiable abort is no issue in case of two-party computation: if the protocol fails then it is clear to the honest party that the other party must be cheating.
Our Results. We propose a new version of the SPDZ protocol that supports identifiable abort: if the protocol aborts then at least one dishonest party will be identified as having cheated. We emphasize that the challenge lies in adding identifiability to SPDZ without increasing its complexity too much; in particular, we want the protocol to run (almost) as fast as the original version in case parties do not misbehave (too much). This is what our protocol achieves.
-In case no cheating takes place, i.e., all the players behave honesty, our protocol is essentially as efficient as the original SPDZ protocol: namely, it has an asymptotic communication complexity of O(n) point-to-point communications per gate and an asymptotical computational cost of O(n) field operations per gate.
We perform extra broadcasts compared to the original SPDZ protocol, but since their number is independent of the circuit size, this can be neglected for large enough circuits. -In case cheating does take place, but to an extent that the protocol can handle it and does not abort, our protocol is slower by a factor at most 2, hence still with an asymptotic complexity of O(n) per gate for both communication and computation. Again, the extra broadcasts can be neglected. -In case cheating takes place and the protocol does abort (with identification), we distinguish between the following two cases (which case occurs depends on the kind of cheating):
• Identification with no agreement: Every honest player has identified at least one player as a cheater, but there may not be agreement among the honest players about the list of cheaters. 2 In this case, our protocol is slower still by a factor 2 only.
• Identification with agreement: There is common agreement among the honest players about at least one player being a cheater. In this case, our protocol may take substantially longer to identify the cheater, namely in this case the number of cryptographic operations to be performed grows with the size of the circuit.
Thus, the only case when our version is significantly slower than the original SPDZ protocol is when a dishonest player cheats so bluntly that he is publicly 1 One has to be careful with this "solution" though: collaborating dishonest parties that remained passive during the first run may now adjust their inputs, given that they have learned the output from the first (failed) run. 2 But every player that is identified by an honest player to be a cheater is a cheater; thus, this case can only occur if there is more than one cheater.
recongnized as being a cheater. However, in many practical scenarios, there seems to be little gain for a dishonest player in slowing down the protocol at the cost of being publicly caught as a cheater, and thus having to face the consequences. Therefore, in typical scenarios, our protocol is similarly efficient as the original SPDZ protocol but, in contrast to the original version, it discourages dishonest players from enforcing the protocol to abort.
Related Work. Cheater detection is achieved by early MPC protocols such as [8] , and by other protocols that are based on the paradigm that players prove in zeroknowledge that they followed the protocol instructions honestly. However, the high communication complexity of these protocols make them unsuitable for practical deployment.
On the other hand, recent MPC protocols (in a so-called offline/online model) are designed to have very high efficiency, like the protocols from the SPDZ family [6, 7] , which feature a very attractive asymptotic communication and computational complexity of O(n) per multiplication gate (for the online phase). However, these protocols do not offer cheater detection. An earlier protocol by Bendlin et al. [3] offers a very weak form of cheater detection: namely, at least one honest player will identify a dishonest one, but other honest players may have no clue on the identity of cheating parties; the protocol has a computational complexity of O(n 2 ) per multiplication gate. The work by Ishai et al. [9] is the first to rigorously define and discuss the notion of cheater detection (in the universal-composability model of Canetti [4] ); the article presents a general compiler that adds cheater detection to any semihonest MPC protocol in the preprocessing model.
A very recent protocol, due to Baum et al. [1] , builds up on the Bendlin et al. approach and achieves full cheater detection with a communication and computational complexity of O(n 2 ) per multiplication gate; this also improves on the best protocol obtained by means of the techniques by Ishai et al.
The goal of our work is to develop a MPC protocol that is "strictly stronger" than SPDZ, in that when not under attack it has the same running time than SPDZ, and when under attack it either gives away cheaters or the protocol can handle the attack and still has the same (asymptotic) running time than SPDZ. This is achieved by our protocol, but is not achieved by any of the above. Indeed, in case no severe cheating takes place, our protocol is at most a factor 2 slower than SPDZ, hence achieving a communication and computation complexity of O(n) per multiplication gate. If cheating does take place to the extent that the protocol aborts, than either we obtain a weaker notion of cheater detection ("identification with no agreement") at the same cost, or we obtain the same notion ("identification with agreement"), but with a overhead in local computations.
The Original SPDZ Protocol

The Setting
SPDZ allows n players P 1 , · · · , P n holding private inputs over a finite field F q to securely evaluate an arithmetic circuit C on their inputs. We assume a synchronous point-to-point communication network that allows for perfectly private and reliable communication between any two players. We also consider a broadcast channel, though this one may have to be implemented using the point-to-point channels (and cryptographic techniques).
Ingredients
SPDZ follows the standard paradigm and computes the circuit C on shared values. At the core are additive sharings, for which the following notation/terminology is used.
-A [·]-sharing of a value z ∈ F q is an additive sharing of z, meaning that each player P i holds a random share z i ∈ F q subject to
Furthermore, to ensure correctness, every shared value is accompanied by a sharing of an authentication tag for the shared value. This is formalized as follows.
-For an arbitrary but fixed 
is privately opened to a player P i if each player P j sends his share z j to P i via a point-to-point and P i computes z := j z j . We say that a sharing is publicly opened if it is privately opened to a designated "king player" P k , and then P k sends the reconstructed value z to all the players via point-to-point channels.
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Note that (for a fixed global key α) a · α -sharing is linear, in the sense that linear combinations can be computed on the shares:
Furthermore, if α is [·]-shared then the same holds for addition with a constant:
Finally, a triple a α , b α , c α is called a multiplication triplet if it consists of three · α -shared random values a, b, c subject to ab = c.
Outline of the SPDZ Protocol
SPDZ is divided into a offline (or pre-processing) phase, and an online phase. The idea is to push most of the (somewhat) expensive cryptographic techniques into the offline phase (which can be executed before the inputs to the computation -or even the actual computation -are known), and rely mainly on very efficient information-theoretic techniques in the online phase.
More concretely, in the offline phase the players make use of an additivehomomorphic and somehwhat multiplicative-homomorphic encryption scheme Enc to produce Additionally, sort of as a "side product" of the generation of all these sharings with the help of the encryption scheme Enc, the following is given at the end of the offline phase for every Recall that Enc is additively-homomorphic, so that linear combinations (and addition with constants) can be computed on the commitments. The actual computation takes place in the online phase. By using the sharings produced in the offline phase as a resource, the online phase can be executed to a large extent by means of very efficient information-theoretic techniquesthe number of cryptographic operations needed is independent of the circit size. Concretely, the online phase is composed of the following gadgets.
-Input sharing: For each input x held by a player P i , a fresh (meaning: yet unused) sharing r α from the offline phase is selected and privately opened to P i . P i then sends ε := x − r to all the players, and altogether the players can then compute a sharing of x as x α = ε + r α . -Distributed addition (and multiplication/addition with constants): For each addition gate in the circuit with shared inputs z α and y α , a sharing of z +y is computed (non-interactively) as z + y α = z α + y α . Correspondingly for multiplication/addition with a constant. -Distributed multiplication: For each multiplication gate in the circuit with shared inputs z α and y α , a sharing of z · y is computed (interactively) by means of the multiplication subprotocol below, which consumes one fresh multiplication triple from the offline phase. -Output reconstruction: For each shared output value z α , the players publicly reconstruct z.
) that has been publicly opened, the players can check the correcntess of z as follows. Every player P i computes y i := γ(z) i −z·α i and broadcasts a commitment of y i , and then every player opens the commitment and the players compute y :
If y = 0 then z is declared to be correct; otherwise, it is declared incorrect and the protocol is immediately aborted.
We do not detail how these gadgets are put together, in particular how/when exactly the tag checking is used, as this is not very relevant to us. However, let us emphasize that a single dishonest player can easily enforce the protocol to abort, e.g., by submitting an incorrect share for a sharing z α that is publicly opened and then checked; the check will recognize (with high probability) that the reconstructed value z is incorrect, and so the protocol will abort, but there is no way for the honest players to find out who submitted an incorrect shares.
Hence, any such dishonest player gets away with it, and hence there is no incentive for a dishonest player not to cheat, should it give him any advantage or satisfaction whatsoever.
Multiplication subprotocol
A fresh multiplication triplet a , b , c is selected, and the following is performed.
1. The players compute ε := z − a and δ := y − b . 2. The sharings ε and δ are publicly opened: -ε and δ are privately opened to a designated king player P k , and -P k sends ε and δ to the others player via the point-to-point channels. 3. The players compute z · y := c + ε b + δ a + εδ.
Our Protocol
An Overview of Our Protocol
We explain on a high level how our protocol works. First, notice that there are three distinct ways for dishonest players to disrupt the protocol execution (and enforce an abort in the original SPDZ protocol):
-During the input sharing phase, dishonest players could send incorrect shares of r to P i , or P i could send inconsistent values ε to the players.
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-During the multiplication step, dishonest players could send incorrect shares of ε and δ to the king player.
-During the multiplication step, a dishonest king player could send false and/or inconsistent values for ε and δ. -In the output reconstruction phase, dishonest players could announce false shares of the output.
We will focus on the two possible attacks in the multiplication step, since our techniques to deal with those can easily be used to also deal with the attacks in the input sharing and output reconstruction phases.
As pointed out above, the players have two "checking mechanisms" available in order to verify the correctness of a reconstructed value z:
-they can use the tag γ(z) of z to check the correctness of z, and -they can use the commitments to check the correctness of the shares z i .
The former technique is very efficient but cannot be used to identify who submitted a false share in case of an incorrect z; this can be done by the latter, but that one is computationally more expensive, and so we want to avoid it as much as possible and use it only as a "last resort". Now, a first and straightforward approach to achieve cheater detection but use the computationally expensive techniques only as a last resort, seems as follows: first, use the "cheap" tag checks to verify the correctness of every reconstructed value (as in the original SPDZ protocol), and then resort to the commitments if and only if an error is detected, in order to find out who claimed an incorrect value.
Unfortunately, this does not work. The reason is that only the king player knows the shares of, say, ε. As such, if ε claimed by the king player turns out to be incorrect, there is no way for an honest player to distinguish the case of a dishonest player P i who has sent an incorrect share ε i to the king player, from the case of a dishonest king player who pretends that he has received an incorrect share ε i from P i . There is no way such a dispute can be resolved, even with the help of the commitments -except if these shares are broadcast from the start, but that would greatly increase the complexity of the protocol.
To deal with such a situation, we use an idea from dispute control: we re-do (part of) the computation in such a way that this particular dispute cannot occur anymore (essentially by choosing a fresh king player). Since the number of disputes is bounded, this means that there is a limit on how often something needs to be re-done, and setting the parameters right ensures that this merely gives a factor-2 blowup.
On the other hand, if a dishonest player P i keeps on claiming an incorrect share for, say, ε, even when the players are asked to broadcast their shares because a fault was detected, then the players can use the (computationally expensive) commitments to find the incorrect share, and the honest players will unanimously identify P i as cheater.
The overall structure of (the computation phase of) our protocol is thus as follows.
Set-up:
The circuit C is divided into consecutive blocks, each comprising ca. |C|/n gates (where "consecutive" here means that C can be evaluated in a block-by-block manner). Furthermore, a list L suspects of suspect players is initialized as the empty set. Computation: Sequentially, for each block the following is done:
I. A king player P k / ∈ L suspects is selected, and the computation is done as in the normal SPDZ protocol by repeatedly invoking the multiplication sub-protocol and doing local computations. II. Once the block has been processed, a checking protocol BlockCheck is invoked that verifies the correctness of the computation. BlockCheck has three possible outcomes:
• Success: The block has been correctly processed. In this case, the players simply move to the next block.
• Fail with Conflict: The block has not been correctly processed, and P k accuses some player(s) of faulty behaviour. In this case, P k and all accused players are added to L suspects , and the players go back to step I. and re-do the computation with a "fresh" P k ∈ L suspects . Should L suspects now consist of all players then the protocol stops; in this case, every honest player has identified at least one dishonest player.
• Fail with Agreement: The block has not been correctly processed, and it is guaranteed that some player has broadcast an incorrect share during the run of BlockCheck. In this case, the players make use of the commitments to unanimously identify the cheating player.
The Checking Protocol BlockCheck
We will now provide a more precise discussion of the check-phase mentioned in the previous section. What it will do is check the correctness and consistency of all the ε's and δ's that were announced by the king player during the multiplication subprotocols in the block to be checked. Let us write z (1) , · · · , z (t) for the sharings of these ε's and δ's. This means that each player P i has communicated his share z
and communicated it to all other players. In the following discussion, we will denote byz (j) i the actual share communicated by P i to P k (so that if P i is dishonest, it may be the case thatz
i ), and byz (j) the value that P k has communicated to the other players. However, we emphasize that that P k is dishonest then he may be inconsistent with the value ofz (j) , different players may receive different values forz (j) .
The subprotocol Block Check now works as follows. As a first step, as checking each value individually is too expensive, a quasi-random linear combination of the z (j) 's is computed:
Step 1: The players run a subroutine Rand to produce a random element e, and they compute the linear combination z := h e h z (h) .
Letz i andz be the respective linear combinations ofz
and of z (1) , · · · ,z (t) . The correctness ofz is then verified as follows.
Step 2: Public Reconstruction. Each player broadcasts his share of z , upon which the king player P k broadcasts a list of players that he accuses of inconsistent behaviour; if he does so, BlockCheck outputs the message "Fail with Conflict" and the list of accused players.
If P k has not accused anybody, then each player can broadcast an accusation against P k , stating that the valuez that he received is different from z (which is now public, since its shares have been broadcast). If that is the case, then once again we are in the "Fail-with-Conflict" case: BlockCheck outputs the corresponding error message and the list of players accusing P k . Now if no accusations have been produced, the next step consists in checking the tag of the now-public valuez:
Step 3: Tag Checking. If no accusations have been produced in Step 2, then players check the tags of z = ([z], [γ(z)]); this is done running a subroutine ZeroTest on [γ(z)] −z [α] , which outputs if it is a sharing of 0, and ⊥ if it is not (except with small probability).
BlockCheck outputs the message "Success" if the tag check succeeds, and "Fail with Agreement" if it fails.
Note that in step 3 above, the players cannot just do a public reconstruction of the sharing [γ(z)]−z[α] to check whether it is a sharing of zero, because in case it is not, the value of γ(z) −zα reveals information on α. That is why a slightly more involved subroutine ZeroTest is invoked, which publicly reconstructs a random multiple of [γ(z)] −z [α] .
If the tag check in step 3 above fails, then this means that a dishonest player P i must have broadcast a false share z i during step 2, or (as we will see) he has broadcast some false share as part of the execution of ZeroTest; in either case, he has broadcast a linear combination (with coefficients that may depend on thez (i) ) of values he is committed to, by means of the commitments from the preprocessing phase and by the linearity of all computations. P i can and will now be publicly identified as cheater by means of a protocol CommitCheck, which simply asks the players to open the commitments to the claimed and broadcast values. We note that CommitCheck causes a significant overhead to the efficiency of the protocol because the players need to perform computations on a large number of commitments, proportional to the size of the circuit; in return, however, it publicly identifies a cheating player.
Note that due to space contstraints, the details of the subroutines Rand, CommitCheck and ZeroTest are given in the appendix, but they are pretty much as expected (except for the issue mentioned above regarding ZeroTest).
Security of Our Protocol
In this section we argue security of our protocol. We focus on the actual computation phase; similar techniques allow us to secure the input-sharing and outputreconstruction phases as well.
The security of the protocol clearly relies on the secrecy of the global key α, which we measure as follows. Let v denote the adversary's view at a given point in the online protocol.
5 Then, the adversary's (average) guessing probability of the global key α is given by
In Appendix A we will prove the following security properties for the checking protocol BlockCheck. Recall, the purpose of BlockCheck is to verify the correctness and consistency 5 Here and below, when we make information-theoretic statements, we understand v to not include the encryptions/commitments of the honest parties shares etc. that were produced during the preprocessing phase. Adding these elements to the adverary's view of course renders the information-theoretic statements invalid, but has a negligible effect with respect to a computationally bounded adversary. Notice that for the above soundness error to be small, we need to bound p guess (α|v). Clearly, at the beginning of the online phase it is 1/q, but it may increase during the course of the protocol. We have the following upper bound, which will be proved in Appendix A: Proposition 2. Throughout the entire protocol, the adversary's guessing probability of α is bounded by
Finally, for completeness, we state here that CommitCheck, which will be invoked if BlockCheck results in "Fail with Agreement", does the job and identifies a dishonest player. Crucial for CommitCheck to work properly is that thẽ z (h) have been consistently announced by P k (so that there is agreement on the linear combination to be computed on the commitments), but this is ensured by the soundness of BlockCheck.
Proposition 3.
Under the binding property of the underlying commitment scheme, if a dishonest player has broadcast as part of BlockCheck an incorrect value, then this player will be publicly identified by CommitCheck. Furthermore, no honest player will incorrectly be identified as being dishonest.
The security of the protocol is now straightforward: as a worst-case scenario, we will assume that the adversary controls all but one of the players. First notice that if the adversary decides to behave (semi)-honestly, then by the correctness of BlockCheck the protocol will reach the end of the circuit and CommitCheck will not be executed.
On the other hand, if the adversary misbehaves in (at least) one of the invocations of the multiplication subprotocol in one of the blocks, either by sending an incorrect share of ε or δ to P k , or by having dishonest P k announce inconsistent values (or both), then this will be detected by BlockCheck that will announce "Fail with Conflict" or "Fail with Agreement", depending on the adversary's precise behavior.
In the case of a "Fail with Conflict", the incorrect data is dismissed and the block is rebooted with a fresh king player that is not in the list L suspects of suspect players. Since every re-boot adds a new player to L suspects , namely the previous king player, we can have at most n such reboots in total before the protocol produces the correct output or before L suspects is "full", and in that case the protocol stops and every honest player has correctly identified at least one dishonest player (because an honest player ends up in L suspects only by accusing a dishonest player). Notice that the commitment check is not executed in this case. On the other hand, if BlockCheck ends with a "Fail with Agreement", then CommitCheck is invoked and will publicly identify a dishonest player.
As for the overall error probability, by combining the soundness error of BlockCheck with the bound on p guess , and observing that BlockCheck is invoked at most 2n times -as we have n blocks plus at most n reboots -we obtain an overall error probability of at most
To sum up, and using a similar checking mechanism for ensuring correctness of the input-sharing and the output-reconstruction phases, our new multiparty computation protocol satisfies the following.
Theorem 1. For any computationally bounded adversary that cannot break the encryptions/commitments used in the preprocessing phase, except with negligible probability, an execution of our protocol results in one of the following cases (depending on the adversary's strategy): I. Success: the protocol reaches the end of the circuit and outputs the correct result to all players. In this case, CommitCheck is not executed. II. Identification without agreement: the protocol aborts, but each honest player has identified at least one dishonest player. Also in this case, CommitCheck is not executed. III. Identification with agreement: the protocol aborts, and the honest players have in-agreement identified at least one dishonest player.
Furthermore, in all cases, the adversary learns no information on the honest players' inputs, beyond the result of evaluating the circuit C on the inputs.
The Complexity of Our Protocol
We discuss in this section the complexity of our protocol; as with the previous sections, we focus on the multiplication check, which is the most expensive part of our protocol. The input sharing and the output reconstruction, moreover, can be analyzed in a similar fashion (i.e., in the general case they yield a complexity of the same order of magnitude as the original SPDZ, and exceed it only to unanimously identify a dishonest player). We thus focus on the multiplication check. We first study the complexity of processing and checking a single block: -First, the gates of the block are evaluated as in standard SPDZ; this yields a complexity of |C|/n · O(n) = O(|C|) field operations (in total over all players) and the same number of field elements for point-to-point communication, and no broadcasts.
-At the end of the block, the subprotocol BlockCheck is executed. Its computation complexity is dominated by computing the linear combination of t = 2 · |C|/n sharings on n shares in step 1; in total, as we will see in Appendix A.2, BlockCheck has a computation complexity of O |C| + n 2 field operations, plus preparing 4n commitments. Its communication complexity consists of no point-to-point communication, and 3n broadcasts of field elements and 4n of commitments and openings. Now as we have seen, BlockCheck can lead an execution of CommitCheck, to a re-boot of the current block, or simply to the processing of the following block. The exact cost of CommitCheck depends on how the commitments were implemented, but it certainly causes a significant overhead given that it involves a number of cryptographic operations that grows with the size of the circuit; however, CommitCheck leads to the public exposure of a dishonest player, so there is little incentive for the adversary to enforce this. As argued in Sect. 3.3, we can have at most n reboots in total before the protocol aborts; as such, the overhead of the reboots causes at most a factor 2 overhead to the ordinary computation of the n blocks.
We thus get the following result summarizing the complexity of our protocol:
Proposition 4. Except in the case where CommitCheck is enforced by the adversary, which would lead to an identification-with-agreement of at least a dishonest player, our protocol has the following complexity:
- Compared to the original SPDZ protocol, in case all players behave honestly, our protocol is as efficient as the original protocol, up to an additive overhead caused by an increased number of commitments and broadcasts 9 , but this overhead is independent of the circuit size and thus negligible except for small circuits. In case of active cheating -unless a dishonest player cheats so bluntly that 7 Note that we treat broadcast as a given primitive here; implementing it using the point-to-point communication and, say, digital signatures, causes some (communication and computation) overhead, but this overhead is independent of the circuit size. 8 The actual cost of these cryptographic operations depends on how the commitment scheme is implemented. 9 Plus that we have to do real broadcasts, whereas in the original SPDZ protocol without cheater detection it is good enough to do a simple consistency check and abort as soon as there is an inconsistency.
CommitCheck is invoked and he will be publicly identified as being a cheaterthe (computation and communication) complexity of our protocol is larger by a factor 2 only, plus the same kind of additive overhead that does not depend on the circuit size.
Conclusion
We presented an alternative to the original SPDZ multiparty computation protocol. In contrast to the original protocol, our version allows for cheater detection.
As such, our protocol is much less vulnerable to a "denial of service" attack: if a dishonest player enforces the protocol to abort, he will be identified and measures can be taken. Furthermore, in our protocol, this feature comes essentially for free: as long as everything works as supposed, our protocol is as efficient as the original SPDZ (up to an additive overhead that is negligible except for small circuits); but as soon as a fault is detected, instead of simply aborting and being clueless about who cheated, we can proceed and -depending on the adversary's behavior -still complete the computation or identify cheaters without agreement with a factor 2 overhead, or identify cheaters with agreement but with a significant overhead.
As such, we think that our multiparty computation protocol is an attractive alternative to the original SPDZ protocol when considering real life scenarios where dishonest parties may have various incentives for sabotaging an execution.
An obvious open problem is to have agreement on the cheater(s) in all cases, and/or without a significant overhead; however, this seems hard to achive without increasing the complexity of the honest execution.
A The Protocol BlockCheck in Detail
We shall now begin the study of the sub-protocol Block Check; we first establish some notation rules that will be used in the whole section: t will denote a positive integer; we assume that t multiplication opening values z (1) , · · · , z (t) have been publicly opened via a king player P k , and we will use the following notation: for each shared value z (h) ,
-each player P j has sent z
denotes the value received by P k from P j (so if P j is honest,z
; -P k has computed and sent to each P j the value z (h) ; -z (h) (j) denotes the value received by each P j from P k (so if P k is honest,
The goal of BlockCheck is to detect errors in this process; as we have seen, the first step of the check consists in computing a (quasi-) random linear combination of the values to be checked. This is performed by generating a seed via the subroutine Rand, and then using the powers of the seed as coefficients of the linear combination. We first define Rand, which assumes that players have access to a commitment scheme (as in standard SPDZ):
Assume that for a given index h ∈ {1, · · · , t} the value received by a given player
P j is incorrect, i.e.z (h) (j) = z (h) ; thenz(j) = z except with probability t/q.
Similarly, if the values received by two players P j and P
, then the same will hold for the corresponding linear combinations, i.e.z(j) =z(i) except with probability t/q. The next step of BlockCheck is the "public opening and conflict" phase; it has already been defined in previous sections, but we will re-write it here in order to make this chapter as self-contained as possible:
PublicOpening:
The protocol takes as input a shared value [z] and the index k of the king player P k ; initialize the boolean value b to and the list L to the empty set ∅.
The following lemma is a direct consequence of the definition of the algorithm, and states that the public opening routine is correct and sound: As hinted in Sect. 3.2, we need to be careful when checking the tags via ZeroTest, as this can increase the adversary's guessing probability of α. We introduce the following definition to model the information on α possessed by the adversary:
Definition 1. Given a distribution p(x, v), we say that the distribution of x given v is a list of size m if there exists a (conditional) distribution p( |v), where the range of consists of lists of m elements in the range of x, such that the following two properties hold for the joint distribution p(x, v, ) := p(x, v)·p( |v):
(I) p(x ∈ ) ≤ maxˆ ∈Im( ) p(x ∈ˆ ); (II) p(x|v =v, =ˆ , x / ∈ˆ ) = p(x|x / ∈ˆ ) for
everyv,ˆ such that the formula is well-defined.
In a nutshell, we use the above definition to formalize the following situation: let v denote the adversary's view and x := α; assume that the distribution of α given v is a list of size m. This means that the adversary has tried to guess the value of α for m consecutive times, and he has learned whether his guess was correct or not after each guess.
We now state the basic properties of ZeroTest, which will in turn imply the desired properties of the tag check; we assume that ZeroTest outputs a boolean value b ∈ { , ⊥}, marking whether the input opens to zero or not, and some extra data that will be omitted in the following lemma. Now that we have fixed the notation for the subroutines, we can state the definition of BlockCheck in a more formal way:
BlockCheck:
The protocol takes as input a block and the index k of the king player P k ; denote by z (1) , · · · , z (t) the multiplication opening values of the block.
(i) Players execute Rand to get a random seed e ∈ F q , then compute the linear combination z := We can now prove the properties of BlockCheck claimed in Sect. 3.3; we omit the proof here, as it can be easily derived from the definition of BlockCheck.
Proposition 5. BlockCheck satisfies the following:
Correctness of BlockCheck: if all players behave honestly and hence allz (j) are correct and consistently announced by P k , then BlockCheck outputs "Success" with probability 1. Finally, we can now prove the bound on the adversary's guessing probability of the global key α: Proposition 6. Throughout the entire protocol, the adversary's guessing probability of α is bounded by
Soundness of
Proof. Clearly, the adversary can increase his guessing probability only during the execution of ZeroTest; this, by definition of BlockCheck, is executed only when the valuez is consistent among players, so that its input is equal to
. Hence we can assume as a worst-case scenario that z =z, so that the adversary's guessing probabilities of α and of x coincide. Notice that at the beginning of the computation, the distribution of α given the adversary's view is a list of guesses of size 0; hence we can inductively apply Lemma 3, so that during the execution of the protocol the distribution of α given the adversary's view is a list of guesses of size at most 2n (recall that BlockCheck, and hence ZeroTest, is executed at most 2n times). Hence according to Definition 1, and given that α is uniformly distributed, there exists a distribution p( |v) with the following properties:
Now from this we can deduce the claimed upper bound on the guessing probability: indeed, by using the law of total probability with the events (α ∈ ) and (α / ∈ ), we obtain
A.1 The Tag Checking in Detail
We discuss in this section the sub-routine ZeroTest, meant to check whether some shared value where r is a variable uniformly distributed and independent of x,x,r andỹ, and the variablesr,x andỹ are chosen by the adversary, and are thus determined by his current view (since we can assume without loss of generality that the adversary is deterministic). Now notice that for anyv 0 we have the following inequality:
In turn, by applying the law of total probability to p((r −r)(x −x) −ỹ = 0) with the events (v 0 =v 0 ), we obtain the following inequality:
Finally, if x = 0 but b = ⊥, then necessarily a player has communicated some incorrect values during ZeroTest; hence since all communications are performed by broadcast, he is committed to the incorrect value, so that the claim is proved.
Finally, we need to discuss the privacy of ZeroTest; we first remark that Definition 1, formalizing our privacy notion, yields the following consequences: Remark 1. Assume that the uniform distribution x is a list of size m given v; we then have the following properties:
for any y = y(v) (consequence of (II) via the law of total probability).
Furthermore, let r be a random variable independent of both v and x, and set v := (v, r). Then it trivially holds that if p(x, v) satisfies the above definition, then so does p(x, v ). x andr are chosen by the adversary, and are thus determined by his view (since we assume without loss of generality that the adversary is deterministic). Now given the adversary's view v 0 before the execution of ZeroTest, the adversary's current view is equal to (v 0 , γ, δ, π); notice that a and b are (jointly) random and independent of x, r, v 0 and π, and thus so are γ = x − a and δ = r − b, so that we may restrict the view to v := (v 0 , π) (cf. Remark 1)
10 . Now by inductive hypothesis, there exists a conditional distribution p( 0 |v 0 ) such that properties I and II hold for p(x, v 0 , 0 ) := p(x, v 0 )·p( 0 |v 0 ); in a natural way, we define the new distribution to be
We now prove that properties I and II hold for p(x, v, ): first of all, notice that
. Hence thanks to Remark 1 we have that
Hence property I holds; we can thus focus on property II. As a first step, notice that
since if x / ∈ˆ , then in particular x =x(v 0 ); hence we can re-write π =π as r =r(v 0 ) +π/(x −x(v 0 )), and can be removed because r is independent of x, v 0 and 0 . We thus get the following equality:
which means that property II holds.
A.2 The Complexity of the Block Check
We briefly discuss in this section the complexity of BlockCheck, which was presented in Sect. 3.4. First notice that since each block contains at most |C|/n gates, there are at most 2|C|/n multiplication opening values to be checked in each block; we thus get the following complexity:
-4n commitments need to be prepared, broadcast and opened (n to produce a random seed via Rand, and 3n during ZeroTest); -the computational complexity of a block check is in O |C| + n 2 field operations (excluding computation on commitments), essentially given by the cost of computing the linear combination of the values to be checked; -finally, the block check requires broadcasting 3n field elements for the dispute phase of PublicOpening. Notice that we do not use point-to-point communication.
We are now ready to define the protocol CommitCheck, that simply applies EncryptionCheck to all shares submitted during the multiplication of two values:
CommitCheck:
The protocol takes as input the index i of a player P i , a shared value z and the values ( a , b , c ) , r used to check its tag. The following proposition summarizes the security property of CommitCheck; we omit the proof, as it can be easily deduced from the definition of the protocol.
Proposition 7.
C Checking the Input and Output of the Computation
We show in this section how to secure the input-sharing and outputreconstruction phases; we use the main ideas and techniques of the multiplication check.
We first describe in more detail how the input sharing is performed in the original SPDZ protocol: each shared value r produce in the preprocessing phase comes with another type of sharing, denoted by for any i. Now in classical SPDZ, whenever a player P i holds input x, a random shared value r is selected; then each player P j communicates r j and γ(r) j i to P i , who computes r and checks that rβ i = j γ(r) j i ; P i can then broadcast either an error message or the value ε := x − r. The input is then shared as r + ε.
We add to this protocol our system of accusations and, as a last resort, the commitment checks:
InputShare:
The protocol is used to share an input x held by player P i ; a fresh king player P k and a shared value r , r are selected. tion of InputShare, then except with probability 1/q he will be deemed suspect or dishonest. -Privacy: if P i is honest, the adversary's guessing probability of x is equal to maxx p(x =x).
We now introduce an output-checking phase which makes use of the protocols introduced in the previous sections: it simply reconstructs the output, then checks its tag with ZeroTest and, if an error is detected, requires player to authenticate their shares via CommitCheck.
OutputCheck:
The protocol takes as input the shared value z , output of the circuit. 
